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Abstract
We examine the incentives incumbents face when creating new polling
places. First, doing so improves incumbents’ ability to monitor brokers
and voters by reducing the number of registered voters per polling sta-
tion. Second, it reduces the distance traveled by citizens to vote, which
undercuts incumbents’ ability to control the electorate via turnout buy-
ing. We evaluate this trade-off in the context of Uganda, where the in-
cumbent significantly influences electoral administration. Drawing on
rich administrative data, we leverage discontinuities in the creation of
polling places to causally identify the independent effects of (1) the num-
ber of voters per polling station and (2) distance to vote on electoral out-
comes. We find that decreasing (1) improves incumbent electoral out-
comes, while reducing (2) worsens them. The benefits for incumbents
outweigh the costs, which rationalizes recent developments to expand
polling infrastructure in Uganda and elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
Incumbent parties in developing countries engage in a multiplicity of strategies, some of which
run afoul of democratic norms, to garner electoral support. A rich literature studies how these
parties engage in clientelistic exchanges with voters (Finan and Schechter 2012; Nichter 2008;
Stokes 2005) and even commit outright outright electoral fraud, including deliberate miscount-
ing of votes or fraudulent registration (Birch 2012; Cantú 2014, 2019; Hidalgo and Nichter
2016; Simpser 2013). These strategies are furthermore conditioned by features of the electoral
administration they face, including those affecting citizens’ costs of voting (Bowles et al. 2019;
Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Hariri et al. 2019).
While such features are typically considered fixed, incumbents often influence electoral ad-
ministration (Chernykh and Svolik 2015). For instance, in many developing countries, incum-
bents may have a voice in deciding the location of electoral precincts (Wong 2019) and the
resources allocated to them (Harris 2020). Some of these decisions directly affect voting be-
havior. This is particularly true of decisions over the creation and spatial allocation of polling
places, which determines who has to travel far to vote and who does not (De Kadt 2019).
In response to changing demographics and international guidelines, large-scale reorganiza-
tions of voting infrastructure have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa over recent decades. Com-
paring the most recent elections in a country to the earliest election for which we have data,
the increase in the number of polling places exhibits drastic variation across countries. This
begs the question of whether the administration of voting has electoral implications and, con-
sequently, whether such variation reflects incumbents deliberately trying to influence electoral
administration to hold on to power.
We study the incentives that incumbent parties have to expand voting infrastructure by in-
creasing the number of polling places. We posit that incumbents face a trade-off between better
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information about local electoral support and continued control over the electorate. First, an
increase in the number of polling places in an area reduces the number of registered voters per
polling place. This is useful for assessing incumbent support and conditioning rewards and sanc-
tions both to party brokers whowork in particular localities (Bowles et al. 2019; Gingerich 2020;
Larreguy 2013; Larreguy et al. 2016) and to voters in that area (Gottlieb and Larreguy 2020;
Rueda 2017). Voters and brokers, anticipating these contingent effects, might be incentivized
to exert more effort in support of the incumbent party (Rosenzweig 2019). Better information
about local support, then, likely improves electoral outcomes for incumbents.
Second, an increase in the number of polling places may reduce the distance that citizens
have to travel to register to vote and cast their ballot (De Kadt 2019). The resource advantage
typically enjoyed by incumbents means they are likely to possess a comparative advantage in
providing transport to mobilize likely supporters far from their polling places (Nichter 2008).
This comparative advantage in turnout buying permits incumbents to control the de facto elec-
torate by shaping the distribution of electoral access across space (Bowles et al. 2019; Larreguy
et al. 2016). Since shorter distances to vote make it harder for the incumbent to effectively dis-
enfranchise opposition voters, increasing the number of polling places in an area may worsen
incumbents’ electoral prospects by weakening their control over electoral access.
Depending on which effect dominates—the increase in information about local support, ver-
sus the reduction in control over electoral access—incumbents face incentives to either expand
or contract the number of polling places. Whether they are able to do this depends on the extent
of their influence over the administration of elections. This influence is likely to exist even in
the presence of nominally independent electoral commissions, and is likely to be greatest in
electoral autocracies (Chernykh and Svolik 2015; Simpser 2013).
To test this theoretical argument, we study the 2016 Ugandan presidential elections. As a
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canonical electoral autocracy, the incumbent National Resistance Movement (NRM) party ex-
ercises substantial influence over the administration of elections (Tripp 2010). The Electoral
Commission (EC), in turn, has repeatedly reorganized the electoral landscape with the official
aims of decongesting polling places and shortening the distances voters must travel to cast bal-
lots. We study what these reorganizations of the voting infrastructure reveal about the incentives
of the incumbent party to sustain its electoral support.
To determine whether the information mechanism or the control mechanism dominates, we
assess the effect of (1) the number of registered voters per polling station, and (2) the weighted
average distance that citizens need to travel to their polling place, on electoral outcomes.1 Our
theoretical argument suggests that both of these explanatory variables are endogenous to the
creation of new polling places. We therefore instrument for these explanatory variables using a
regression discontinuity design that leverages the repeated application of similar administrative
rules to reorganize polling places between the 2011 and 2016 elections. The first round of
reorganization, which took place in 2013, created new polling places for voter registration in
2015 when a polling place from the 2011 election exceeded 900 registered voters.2 In the second
round, which took place once voter registration had concluded in 2015, polling places with more
than 900 registered voters in the new 2015 voter register were split into multiple polling places.
The intuition behind our identification strategy is that, while each application of the admin-
istrative rule is likely to affect both (1) and (2), if the effect of (1) and (2) is different in 2013
than in 2015, then we have two independent sources of variation to instrument for their effects
on electoral outcomes. Importantly, since the overlap of discontinuity samples is only partial,3
1A polling place is the venue for registration and voting, and can be split into multiple colocated polling
stations.
2For Kampala and Wakiso—the two capital districts—the cutoff was 1,200 voters, but for simplicity we speak
of a 900-voter cutoff throughout.
3If a polling place is split in the first reorganization, it is less likely that it will find itself close to the threshold
again in the subsequent reorganization. A polling place may thus appear within one discontinuity sample but not
the other.
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we adopt seemingly unrelated regression-style estimating equations. Specifically, we stack the
data of 2016 polling places within a bandwidth of the thresholds determining polling place splits
in 2013 and 2015. To evaluate effects we use unusually rich administrative data obtained from
various sources. These include the complete voter registers for the 2011 (n = 13.7 million)
and 2016 (n = 15.3 million) elections as well as geocoded polling station-level results for both
elections.
To gauge the magnitude of the trade-off faced by incumbent parties, we focus on the first
stage of the instrumental variable estimation to assess the effect of a predicted additional polling
place on the number of registered voters per polling station and the average distance to polling
places in 2016. Together with the instrumental variable estimates, the first stage estimates then
allow us to assess how an additional polling place affects turnout and vote share for the incum-
bent and opposition. Lastly, we focus on the reduced form effects to directly estimate the effect
of an additional polling place on electoral outcomes.
Our first stage estimates are aided by the sequence of the two administrative rules, which af-
fected the number of voters per polling station and their average distance to their polling places
differently in 2013 than in 2015. Since the 2013 reorganization took place prior to voter regis-
tration, it increased the total number of registered voters by reducing the distance unregistered
voters needed to travel to register. Our first stage estimation therefore accounts for how the ef-
fect of predicted polling place creation during the 2013 reorganization varies as a function of the
distance of previously unregistered voters to their corresponding polling place before 2013. We
find that predicted polling place creation in 2013 leads to a small average increase in distances
faced by voters, which is driven by the registration of remote, previously unregistered voters.
In contrast, for the reorganization that took place after registration in 2015, and thus had no
effect on overall registration levels, predicted polling place creation has a strictly negative effect
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on distance. Lastly, we find that predicted polling place creation both in 2013 and 2015 has a
negative effect on the number of registered voters at affected polling stations in 2016.
Our instrumental variable estimates confirm the incumbent’s trade-off. On the one hand, a
one standard deviation reduction in the number of registered voters (a drop of 190 voters) leads
to a 2 percentage point (pp) increase in incumbent, but not opposition, turnout. This effect is
consistent with our hypothesis that splitting polling places increases the incumbent’s ability to
mobilize voters due to more precise information about voting behavior. On the other hand, a
one standard deviation reduction in the distance of voters to their polling place (corresponding
to 2 kilometers) leads to a 7pp decrease in vote share for the incumbent. This effect is driven
mostly by increased opposition turnout, thus highlighting how the incumbent can exert control
over the electorate by manipulating distances faced by voters.
Taken together, as the reduced form effects ultimately show, the effect of an additional
polling place depends on its relative effects on the number of registered voters and the distance
to vote, as well as how each of those variables affects electoral outcomes. The polling places
that were created in the 2013 reorganization unequivocally benefitted the incumbent. Overall,
this change improved the incumbent’s vote share, especially so in more remote areas with high
numbers of previously unregistered voters, with effects of up to 3pp. In contrast, additional
polling places resulting from the 2015 reorganization overall weakly hurt the incumbent’s vote
share by less than 1pp. This outcome was the result of two effects: first, the reduction in the
number of registered voters per polling station did not contribute much to incumbent turnout,
and second, in contrast to the 2013 reorganization, an average reduction in the distance to vote
increased opposition turnout. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the creation of
new polling places in 2013 and 2015 overall contributed to the incumbent’s vote share in 2016,
particularly among citizens who were far from polling places prior to 2013.
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Finally, to probe the broader implications of these results, we compile an original dataset
of the number of polling places in each presidential election in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990.
We document substantial variation in the number of polling places by country and over time.
These changes reflect differences in the motivations and abilities of different incumbent par-
ties to expand voting infrastructure. We show that across sub-Saharan Africa, countries with
less independent electoral commissions, which are characteristic of autocracies and countries
with strong presidentialism, have more polling places for the same number of registered voters.
This stylized fact is consistent with our results that more polling places favors the incumbent,
suggesting that apparent increases in the representation of more marginalized citizens might be
driven by motivations other than a sincere effort to eliminate barriers to electoral participation.
It follows that our results carry practical importance by pointing to the potential partisan effects
of a tool that is broadly believed to strengthen democracy.
2 Theoretical framework
An increase in the number of polling places in a territory is likely to simultaneously reduce the
average number of registered voters per polling station and the distance that registered voters
must travel to cast their vote. We argue that, in contexts where incumbents have influence over
electoral administration and a comparative advantage in mobilizing voters through turnout buy-
ing, they face conflicting incentives to expand the number of polling places. While a reduction
in the number of registered voters per polling station improves the information incumbents can
obtain to monitor and hence incentivize electoral support, reductions in distance traveled to cast
a vote might undermine their control over the composition of the electorate.
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Information on levels of local electoral support
A growing literature studies the dynamics of voter mobilization in clientelistic democracies
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005). This literature studies the strategies that parties
use to monitor, and subsequently incentivize, the behavior of both their political brokers and the
groups of voters these brokers are tasked with mobilizing.
With respect to brokers, prior research has demonstrated how parties analyze electoral out-
comes at the polling station-level, including turnout and vote shares, and construct noisy signals
about brokers’ performance on which they base rewards for brokers (Bowles et al. 2019; Gin-
gerich 2020; Larreguy 2013; Larreguy et al. 2016).4 Parties’ ability to incentivize brokers’ effort
then depends on their capacity to monitor brokers’ performance. This is easier to do when there
are fewer voters per polling station. At small polling stations, electoral results therefore become
more precise indicators of the performance of individual brokers (Bowles et al. 2019; Larreguy
2013; Larreguy et al. 2016). An improved capacity to monitor brokers’ effort then allows parties
to induce greater individual broker effort with respect to mobilizing voters and, consequently,
attain better electoral outcomes.
With respect to voters, a related literature shows how parties use electoral results to condi-
tion the spatial targeting of rewards and sanctions. The creation of new, smaller polling places
which map more closely to particular localities enables parties to extract better signals about
their electoral support, which they can use to target distributive goods once in office (Gottlieb
and Larreguy 2020). Additionally, because voters anticipate that their locality will be rewarded
should their preferred candidate win, the availability of electoral results at low levels of aggre-
gation should incentivize the turnout of particular groups aiming to signal their support (Rueda
2017). More precise information about electoral support in their area, therefore, may also in-
4Parties also monitor other outcomes of brokers’ effort, such as turnout at rallies and political merchandising
within their neighborhood (Szwarcberg 2014).
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centivize voters to coordinate their vote (Jung and Long 2018).
The ability of a party to make use of this improved information depends on how well the
party is equipped to mobilize turnout. Incumbent parties have access to more resources than
challenger parties, which allows them to set up relatively sophisticated machines to monitor and
incentivize their political brokers to ensure that they mobilize voters on their behalf (Bowles et
al. 2019; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013). Therefore, more precise information about local elec-
toral support is likely to incentivize citizens to vote for dominant incumbent parties in particular
(Rosenzweig 2019).
Control of the electorate
Variation in citizens’ costs of voting affects both their incentives to vote and their susceptibility
to clientelistic modes of mobilization. A critical factor in citizens’ decisions about whether to
vote is the distance they need to travel to their polling place. Numerous studies from developed
(Brady andMcNulty 2011; Cantoni 2019; Haspel andKnotts 2005) and developing democracies
(De Kadt 2019; Harris and van der Windt 2019) indicate that citizens’ decisions to register to
vote and turn out to vote are highly sensitive to the distance they need to travel.
Because citizens that need to travel further to their polling place face a higher cost of vot-
ing, these individuals are more likely to be influenced by turnout buying (Bowles et al. 2019;
Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Larreguy et al. 2016). Given their significant resource advantages,
incumbent parties are likely to possess comparative advantages in such turnout buying (Bowles
et al. 2019; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013). In contrast, relatively under-resourced challenger par-
ties do not have the means available to mobilize their likely supporters who face prohibitively
long distances to their respective polling places.
In this way, high physical barriers to electoral access enable the incumbent to exert sig-
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nificant control over the de facto electorate. Assuming reductions in distance affect incumbent
supporters and non-supporters alike,5 the incumbent party has an interest in citizens facing high
costs of voting. By allowing the costs of voting to effectively disenfranchise citizens, the party
can selectively mobilize supporters who face high costs of voting, while leaving behind citizens
sympathetic to the opposition. The ability to selectively control the electorate weakens as costs
of voting are reduced.
Recent scholarship shows how parties respond to changes in the cost of voting by prioritiz-
ing vote buying over turnout buying (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Hariri et al. 2019). Therefore,
reductions in the distance traveled to vote might still advantage incumbent parties, as they will
simply substitute from vote buying to turnout buying. However, in contrast to buying turnout,
monitoring whether voters vote as directed is difficult under the secret ballot, reducing the ef-
fectiveness of such vote buying vis-a-vis turnout buying (Nichter 2008). Consequently, from
the perspective of the incumbent, a residual advantage in vote buying is unlikely to compensate
for their reduced capacity to selectively mobilize voters.
Incentives to expand voting infrastructure
Incumbents often possess significant influence over electoral administration. Chernykh and
Svolik (2015) argue that electoral commissions with moderate pro-incumbent biases are likely
to exist in equilibrium in a broad set of developing democracies where incumbents possess su-
perior information about their electoral support than their challengers do. In contexts where
incumbents enjoy significant resource advantages and some degree of control over the admin-
istration of elections, incumbents face a trade-off when deciding whether to expand the number
5One could imagine that reductions in distance were intentionally implemented in supporting areas. However,
directing reductions in the cost of voting specifically at supporters is challenging. This is especially so in areas




On the one hand, more polling places may lead to fewer registered voters per polling sta-
tion, which helps the incumbent access more precise information about local electoral support.
This improved ability to monitor brokers and voters may ultimately improve the incumbents’
electoral performance. On the other hand, more polling places are likely to reduce incumbents’
control over the electorate because the costs of voting decline, making it harder to selectively
buy turnout. This is likely to have a negative effect on their electoral performance. An incum-
bent’s incentive to increase or decrease the number of polling places is influenced by which of
these two competing effects dominates.
Empirical implications
We summarize the empirical predictions of our theoretical framework here. Let β1 represent
the effect of (1) the number of registered voters in a polling station and let β2 represent the
effect of (2) the distance voters must travel, on electoral outcomes for the incumbent. Let π1
and π2 represent the effect of creating a new polling place on (1) and (2), respectively. Finally,
let α represent the overall effect of creating a new polling place on electoral support for the
incumbent.6
First, we formalize the expected effect of polling place creation on the number of registered
voters per polling station, and the distance voters must travel to vote.
Hypothesis 1 Polling place creation reduces the number of registered voters at each polling
station and the distance faced by voters to cast their vote. Formally, π1 < 0, π2 < 0.
Second, we formalize the conflicting incentives incumbents face.
6Mechanically, given our theoretical framework, α = β1π1 + β2π2.
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Hypothesis 2 Increases in the number of registered voters in a polling station worsen electoral
outcomes for the incumbent, while increases in distance to vote improve them. Formally, β1 <
0, β2 > 0.
Third, we formalize the net effect of polling place creation and what it implies for the ex-
pansion of voting infrastructure.
Hypothesis 3 If β1π1 + β2π2 = α > (<) 0, i.e., the net electoral effects of polling place cre-
ation are positive (negative), incumbents are (dis)incentivized to increase the number of polling
places.
3 Electoral politics in Uganda
We test our theoretical argument in the context of the 2016 presidential election in Uganda.
The National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by president Yoweri Museveni, has held power
continuously since 1986. Museveni was re-elected for his fifth term in office with 61% of the
vote in 2016, defeating his long-time rival Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change
(FDC). Uganda is broadly classified as an electoral autocratic regime (Tripp 2010), with the
incumbent party enjoying substantial resource advantages over the opposition (Platas and Raffler
2020). Below, we describe NRM’s advantages in terms of the party’s finances, its ability to
mobilize voters, and its control of electoral administration.
Financial resource advantages
Political parties, especially the incumbent, spend a significant amount on elections (Grossman
and Michelitch 2018). Running for office is expensive for candidates, with conservative esti-
mates suggesting that candidates spent as much as $60,000 for a parliamentary seat (Collord
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2016). Of the $716 million spent on the 2016 parliamentary and presidential elections, an over-
whelming majority was spent by either NRM candidates or independents (ACFIM 2015).7
Much of these funds, primarily raised by candidates themselves (Collord 2016), support
clientelistic initiatives. In a survey of more than 28,000 Ugandan respondents around the 2016
elections, 40% of respondents acknowledged receiving cash for their vote (Blattman et al. 2020).
This share is virtually unchanged from the 2011 elections (Afrobarometer 2012). It is over-
whelmingly candidates affiliated with the NRM that have the capacity to conduct this mobiliza-
tion strategy (EOM 2016, p. 18), and of the respondents that reported receiving cash for their
vote, 83% were approached by agents representing the incumbent party (Blattman et al. 2020).
Party organization and clientelistic strategies
Interviews with 438 brokers in Uganda, conducted after the 2016 elections, indicate that voter
mobilization relies on the efforts of brokers, whomobilize supporters by arranging transport and
by materially compensating supporters for their time (Blattman et al. 2020). An overwhelming
share of village-level brokers are recruited locally. Brokers are usually well-connected individ-
uals, who both know and are known by their fellow villagers.
Because brokers play such an important role, political parties exhibit a high level of or-
ganization in how they recruit and manage them. The candidates’ campaign apparatuses are
organized as sophisticated pyramid structures, with leaders at the constituency level, coordina-
tors at the subcounty level, and managers at the parish level, who are ultimately responsible for
recruiting and managing village-level brokers. Parish managers reward their brokers based on
their performance, which they monitor in various ways. More than half of the brokers in the
survey mention explicitly that candidates keep track of their individual performance. Brokers’
7Independent candidates are often those that ran unsuccessfully in NRM primary elections but remain loyal to
the president.
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performances are evaluated based on polling station-level results and campaign rally attendance,
as well as the general visibility of the candidate in the community. A quarter of brokers reported
that they were contracted to deliver particular vote margins for the candidate in their locality of
operation.
In Uganda, turnout buying is important to the NRM, which draws a lot of its support from
rural areas. In order to achieve favorable electoral results, just short of half of surveyed brokers
report spending a substantial share of the funds they are allocated on the transportation of likely
supporters. Brokers report how they direct a significant share of their expenditures on boda
boda drivers, taxis, and fuel to transport voters to their polling station. As one broker stated,
“I would put all this money only on transport because transport is so crucial” (Luwero, May
2017). Brokers also describe how they cross-check the voters’ register to ensure voters do in
fact comply by turning up at the polling station on election day.
Control of electoral administration
The Ugandan Electoral Commission (EC) maintains little independence from the NRM. Com-
menting on the 2016 elections in Uganda, the European Union’s Election Observation Mission
concluded that the Electoral Commission “lacked independence and transparency”, specifically
in the appointment of the EC’s board members, who are selected by the president and approved
by the NRM-dominated parliament. The EC’s partiality for the incumbent party is an important
reason why elections are considered as falling “short of international standards for the conduct
of democratic elections at key stages” (EOM 2016).
Ample anecdotal evidence indicates how the EC tilts the playing field to favor the NRM. For
example, there were widespread reports that election materials arrived late at a large number
of polling stations in opposition strongholds such as Kampala and Wakiso (Newsweek 2016).
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In some instances, voters had to wait for seven hours before election materials arrived, only to
realize that presidential ballots were not included (The Guardian 2016).
The electorate is aware of the EC’s partisanship. Citizens’ trust in the EC is waning, with
close to 55% reporting “little” or “no trust at all” in the EC in a 2018 survey, up from 40% in
2015 (Afrobarometer 2015, 2018). In the same survey of Ugandan citizens prior to the 2016
elections, around 20% believed that appointing a non-partisan EC was the most pressing issue
to address.
4 Administrative reorganization of polling places
In recent years the electoral commission has repeatedly reorganized the administration of elec-
tions. We focus on two central components of the electoral administration inUganda: the polling
place and the polling station. A polling place is the venue for registration and voting, and it is
often located at a school, market, or church. Polling places are split into multiple colocated
polling stations where citizens actually cast their vote. Since Uganda did not maintain a perma-
nent voter register at the time, all citizens seeking to vote in the 2016 election had to register
in any of the polling places in their parish of residence or of birth. Once the National Voters’
Register (NVR) was finalized, registered voters were assigned to the polling place closest to
their village of residence (EC 2019).











Figure 1: Timeline of polling place reorganizations
Administrative rules determined two rounds of polling place reorganization between 2011
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and 2016. These reorganizations officially aimed at enabling voters to conveniently cast their
votes by reducing (1) the number of registered voters per polling station, and (2) the distance
that voters needed to travel to their polling place (EOM 2016). Figure 1 provides a timeline.
The first round of reorganization took place in August 2013 (“2013 reorganization”), prior to
voter registration, and the second round took place from January to April 2015 (“2015 reorga-
nization”), after voter registration. The 2013 reorganization split polling places exceeding 900
registered voters (or any such multiple) into several, geographically dispersed polling places on
the basis of the 2011 voter register. The 2015 reorganization also split polling places or added
extra polling stations to polling places exceeding 900 registered voters (or any multiple of 900)
after the completion of voter registration.8 Figure 2 illustrates the partial compliance with the
900-voter administrative rules determining polling place reorganizations, which motivates the
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Figure 2: Compliance with the 900-voter administrative rule.
Note: The outcome in plots (a) and (b) is whether there was a polling place split (i.e. a new polling place was
created).
8When splitting a polling place into multiple stations, voters were equally divided among the polling stations,
generally according to their last names. For example, with two polling stations at the same polling place, one would
serve voters with, say, last names beginning with A-K and the other last names beginning with L-Z.
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Illustration of the effect on the number of registered voters and distance to vote
To illustrate how the polling place reorganizations worked, Figure 3 gives the example of how
the 2013 and 2015 reorganizations affected the number of registered voters per polling station
and distance to vote in the Kiboota parish in Western Uganda. In 2011, polling place A had
1,063 registered voters from five villages, who were on average 978 meters away. To comply
with the 2013 reorganization, polling place B was added prior to voter registration. Once reg-
istration was over, A now had 964 registered voters from three villages, who were on average
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Figure 3: Reorganization of polling places in Kiboota parish
Note: Circles indicatepolling place and triangles illustrate voters in villages. Color indicates village–polling station
affiliation. Dashed line indicates parish border.
As a result of the 2015 reorganization, a third polling place C was added since A still ex-
ceeded 900 registered voters. Voters from the five villages in the parish were now distributed at
three polling places for the 2016 election. The average polling place size was 490 (compared to
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1,063 in 2011) and the average distance was 552meters (compared to 978 in 2011). Our theoret-
ical framework suggests that this change represents mixed news for the incumbent party. On the
one hand, the improved mapping between villages (where brokers are also typically organized)
and polling places improves what information the incumbent can extract from electoral results.
On the other hand, with distance needed to travel to vote falling substantially, the incumbent
party’s ability to shape the electorate in the parish is weakened since it cannot—to the same
extent—leverage its comparative advantage in voter mobilization.
Aggregate implications for the number of registered voters and distance to vote
The effect of the two reorganizations is also apparent at the national level. Even though the
number of registered voters in Uganda increased between the 2011 and the 2016 elections—
13.7 million voters registered in 2011 compared to 15.3 million in 2016—the 2013 and 2015
reorganization reduced the number of registered voters per polling station, as illustrated in Figure
4.
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Figure 4: Distribution of distance to polling place and registered voters at polling station
Note: Horizontal lines indicate the mean. Distance is weighted by number of registered voters.
In turn, Figure 4 masks two countervailing effects that the reorganizations had on the dis-
tance that registered voters had to travel to vote. The 2013 reorganization was implemented prior
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to voter registration for the 2016 election. Because it created new, geographically dispersed
polling places, the 2013 reorganization had the effect of increasing the number of registered
voters by making registration easier. The average distance of registered voters to their polling
place sometimes actually increased after the 2013 reorganization when individuals who lived in
remote parishes and previously were not registered due to long distances now were registered.9
The 2015 round of reorganization, in contrast, was implemented after voter registration was
concluded, thus it had no effect on overall voter registration numbers. It did, however, create
new, geographically dispersed polling places to serve registered voters, and thus the average
distance of registered voters to their polling place went down after the 2015 reorganization.
This variation in the effects of the two rounds of reorganization on distance to polling places,
as well as on the number of registered voters, allows us to estimate the effects of each variable
on electoral outcomes. Below we describe how we use this variation for identification.
5 Data
We make use of three sources of administrative data to examine the electoral consequences of
polling place creation. First, we use the complete voter registers for the 2011 elections (n=13.7
million) and 2016 elections (n=15.3 million) scraped from the Electoral Commission website.
This data provides every voter’s name, age, village, and polling station. Second, we use ge-
olocated polling station–level presidential election results from 2011 and 2016. Third, we use
administrative data sources, including geolocated data from the 2014 National Population and
Housing Census and mappings of administrative units over time from the Electoral Commission
of Uganda.
9Note that we are referring to a measure of average distance of registered voters to their polling places, not
average distance of all citizens to their polling place. The former went up after the 2013 reorganization; the latter
almost certainly went down.
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Matching polling stations over time
Implementing our identification strategy requires that we match each polling station in 2016 to
each polling place as it existed before the 2013 reorganization and as it existed in between the
2013 and 2015 reorganization. Doing this allows us to identify polling stations in 2016 that were
created as a result of the 2013 or 2015 reorganizations. This data-intensive exercise, described
fully in Appendix A.1, was accomplished through an iterative process of (1) standardizing the
geographical identifiers of polling stations across 2013, 2015, and 2016; (2) matching based
on any time-invariant polling station names; (3) matching based on high shares of the same
registered voters in the 2011 and 2016 voter registers; and (4) matching based on high shares of
voters from the same villages between the 2015 village-polling station data and the 2016 voter
register.10
As a result, for each polling station in 2016, we identify its (potentially invariant) polling
place before the first reorganization in 2013, before the second reorganization in 2015, as well
as the corresponding number of registered voters and average distance to the polling place (in
both 2013 and 2015), and prior electoral outcomes from 2011.
Our data is at the polling station–level in 2016, where we observe 28,010 polling stations
nested within 24,355 unique polling places (up from 23,054 and 20,905, respectively, in 2013
and 2011). We provide descriptive statistics for the variables outlined below in Table A2.
Dependent variables
At the polling station–level in 2016, we construct outcomes measuring electoral support in the
presidential election for the incumbent NRMparty aswell as aggregate support for all opposition
10We do not have a full voter register from after the 2015 registration period but before the 2015 reorganization.
Such a dataset would comprise an identical set of voters, but they would be assigned differently across polling
places. Instead, we have data from after the 2015 registration period which lists the number of voters per village
at each polling station.
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parties. For both, we consider (1) party turnout, defined as total votes received by the party
divided by the total number of registered voters at that polling station; (2) party vote share,
where the denominator is instead the total number of votes cast at the that polling station. We
also calculate total turnout at each polling station (measured as all votes cast divided by total
number of registered voters).
Independent variables
Our primary independent variables are the number of registered voters assigned to each polling
station within a polling place and the weighted average distance that registered voters would
face to cast their ballots.
The number of registered voters assigned to each polling station in the 2016 election is
reported in the administrative data. The mean number of registered voters at a polling station
was 592 voters in the 2011 election, 549 voters after the 2013 reorganization, and 545 voters
in the 2016 election. To compute the weighted average distance of registered voters from their
assigned polling place, we first geocode villages listed in the voter register as citizens’ home
localities (n = 58,000) by matching them to the 2014 village census containing the location of
all villages in Uganda. For a given polling place, we then calculate its distance to each of the
villages where its registered voters reside. We take the average of these distances, weighted by
the numbers of registered voters per village, as our measure of average distance to vote at the
polling place–level (for detailed information see Appendix A.2). Consistent with the expansion
of the number of polling places over time, the weighted mean distance to a polling place was
1.46 km in the 2011 election, 1.33 km after the 2013 reorganization, and 1.28 km in the 2016
election.11
11The overall decline in distance following the 2013 reorganization is consistent with a selective positive effect
of the same reorganization on distance. While many polling places experienced reductions in distance between the
2011 election and the period following voter registration, they are typically excluded from the subset comprising
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6 Empirical strategy
In this section we outline an empirical strategy that permits the estimation of both the net effect
of polling place creation on electoral outcomes, as well as the individual effects of the number
of registered voters per polling station and average distance to the polling place.
Intuition
To estimate the effects of the number of registered voters and the average distance that voters
have to travel to their polling place, consider the following ‘structural’ equation:
yi = β1RegVotersi + β2Distancei + εi, (1)
where yi measures an electoral outcome at polling station i. The key implication of our the-
oretical framework, captured by Hypothesis 2, is that the incumbent may face a trade-off in
the creation of new polling places because β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 when yi measures electoral
support for the incumbent. Smaller polling places may be easier to monitor, but reducing the
distance voters have to travel to vote could undercut the incumbent’s comparative advantage in
mobilization.
Estimating Equation (1) requires at least two instrumental variables for the two independent
variables to causally estimate the β parameters. The first inferential challenge is that the number
of registered voters at the polling station and the distance that they have to travel to their polling
place are likely endogenous: confounders may determine both the allocation of new polling
places and electoral outcomes.
To deal with this challenge, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design leveraging the
discontinuous creation of new polling places between 2011 and 2016. Polling places existing
our discontinuity analysis sample of polling places affected by the reorganizations. Within this sample, as we show
below, the effect of the 2013 reorganization on distance is weakly positive.
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prior to the 2013 or 2015 reorganizations withmore than 900 registered voters were more likely
to be split into multiple polling places for the 2016 election than were polling places with just
below 900 registered voters. Moreover, since the 2013 reorganization took place before voter
registration, it increased the total number of registered voters by reducing the distances faced
by previously unregistered voters. In turn, the timing of the reorganizations likely influences
the effect of polling place creation on the number of registered voters at the polling station and
average distance. While the 2015 reorganization reduced distance generally, the 2013 reorga-
nization’s effect on average distance is conditioned by the distance of previously unregistered
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p × Forcing15p ) + ωXp + ε15ip (3)
where yYip indicates electoral outcomes at polling station i in 2016 which had been part of
polling place p in Y ∈ {2013, 2015}. TYp is an indicator for whether p contained more than the
threshold number of registered voters (and therefore was likely to be split) in reorganization Y.
ForcingYp is the forcing variable measuring the deviation between the number of registered vot-
ers in p in Y and the closest threshold (polling places are split at each multiple of 900 voters).
DPUV13p is the distance-weighted measure of previously unregistered voters to their polling
place, which we standardize at mean zero and standard deviation one so that the coefficient on
predicted polling station split captures the mean effect.12 Last, Xp is a vector of pre-treatment
12We provide full robustness tests where we exclude this interaction term. However, as our first stage results
indicate, doing this risks introducing a violation of the monotonicity assumption required for the instrumental
variable estimates to be valid.
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covariates defined at the polling place level prior to the 2013 reorganization, that includes total
turnout, incumbent turnout, opposition turnout, and distance to vote. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the level of the pre–2013 reorganization polling place. We restrict the sample to polling
stations within a narrow bandwidth of the 900-voter threshold. Specifically, we define our base-
line bandwidth as +/- 200 registered voters and demonstrate robustness to different bandwidth
choices.
These two first stage specifications provide us with three candidate instruments T13p , T15p ,
and T13p × DPUV13p . While this generates plausibly exogenous variation in the creation of
new polling places, there is a potential second inferential challenge. Specifically, Equation (1)
might be underidentified if the variation captured by the the three candidate instruments is not
sufficiently independent to instrument for the two endogenous variables.
We address this potential challenge with the observation that, while the 2013 and 2015 re-
organizations likely affected both independent variables in Equation (1) simultaneously, their
effects likely differ both in magnitude and possibly sign due to differences in their implemen-
tation. This variation permits us to instrument for both explanatory variables using T13p , T13p ×
DPUV13p , and T15p and hence identify β1 and β2 in Equation (1). So long as T13p and T13p ×
DPUV13p have sufficiently different relative effects on the first stage outcomes compared to T15p ,
the variation in these first stage effects may be leveraged to identify the independent effect of
the number of registered voters in a polling station and the effect of distance to a polling place
on electoral outcomes.
Estimating equations
The potential use of T13p , T13p × DPUV13p , and T15p as instruments for polling station size and
distance faces one more empirical challenge. Since our unit of observation is polling station i
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in 2016, we effectively have two discontinuity samples: the subset of i that were part of 2011
polling places that were close to the threshold number of registered voters that determined a
polling place split during the 2013 reorganization, and the (possibly overlapping) subset of i
that were part of polling places after voter registration in 2015 that were close to the threshold
number of registered voters that determined a polling place split during the 2015 reorganization.
As Figure A2 indicates, these two discontinuity samples only partially overlap. We address this
final challenge through implementing estimating equations in the spirit of a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR). The SUR setup stacks these two discontinuity samples together to account
for the partial extent of their overlap.
Denoting the relevant discontinuity sample with superscripts, our outcome takes the form
of the appended vector (y13ip , y
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BW) depending on the band-
width, BW, used to define the two discontinuity samples and hence the number, n, of polling
stations in 2016 that were part of polling place p in 2013 or 2015 within this bandwidth at the
point of reorganization.13 Similarly, the two endogenous variables are defined by the vectors
(RegVoters13ip , RegVoters
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ip ). Finally, the three excluded instru-
ments take the form of three vectors: (T13p , 0), (T13p × DPUV13p , 0), and (0, T15p ), with parallel
forms for their relevant forcing variables and their interactions with the instruments.
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where Equation (4) provides first stage and reduced form estimates, and Equation (5) is the
instrumental variables specification. While we use a bandwidth of +/- 200 registered voters
to define the discontinuity samples for the two reorganizations, we demonstrate robustness to
different bandwidth choices.14
Identification assumptions
Several identifying assumptions must be satisfied to uncover the structural parameters of inter-
est from Equation (1) by instrumenting RegVotersi and Distancei with T13p , T13p × DPUV13p ,
and T15p . First, for relevance, we need that each of the instruments affect at least one of the
two endogenous variables. Conditional on this, we need sufficient variation in the relative ef-
fects of the instruments on the two endogenous variables to be able to separately identify the
structural parameters β1 and β2. The partial F-statistics from the first stage regressions and the
F-statistic drawn from the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of Equation (5) discussed
later generally support this assumption.
Second, exogeneity of the instruments requires that polling places that are just above the
threshold in 2013 or 2015 are on average similar to those that are just below, as well as along
the various values of DPUV13. In Table A3 we regress a set of pre-treatment variables defined
14This bandwidth gives us a total of 12,895 observations, evenly split across the two discontinuity samples.
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in 2013 onto Equation (4). Interpreting the balance tests, we find no systematic evidence of
imbalance on pre-treatment measures of electoral outcomes, distance to vote, or geographical
location for T13, T13 × DPUV13, or T15. Similarly, Figure A3 indicates that there are not
differential densities of polling places around the discontinuities.
Third, the clear threat to monotonicity relates to the 2013 reorganization, since its timing
before voter registration in 2015 creates the possibility that the distance to vote in some polling
places increases due to inducing the registration of a large number of previously remote indi-
viduals. This concern is addressed by the inclusion of the interaction with DPUV13, which
enables us to isolate how the effects of polling place splits vary with the distance of previously
unregistered voters. Fourth, the key potential threat to the exclusion restriction relates to the
non-randomness of the location of the new polling places, even if their creation is as-if random.
Table A4 shows that polling stations in 2016 included in any of the discontinuity samples, but
just above or below the 900-voter threshold appear broadly identical in terms of local character-
istics, which supports the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
7 Results
First stage
First, we estimate how predicted polling place splits as a result of the two reorganizations affect
the two endogenous variables of interest— the number of registered voters assigned to a polling
station and their average distance to vote in 2016. Table 1, estimated using Equation (1), presents
the first stage effects of a predicted polling place split on standardized measures of the number
of registered voters at the polling station and distance to vote in 2016.
Interpreting the distance results first, we find that a predicted split in 2015 is associated with
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T13 (α1) -0.464*** 0.070*
(0.043) (0.040)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.024 0.163**
(0.051) (0.065)
T15 (α2) -0.485*** -0.146***
(0.043) (0.050)
Partial F-statistic 54.79 9.88
Observations 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Out-
come variables: Column (1) reports standardized number
of registered voters per polling station; column (2) reports
standardized distance of voters to polling station. Controls
include turnout, incumbent turnout, opposition turnout,
and distance to the polling place, all measured using data
from 2011 election. Partial F-statistic computed follow-
ing Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016).
All specifications are estimated using OLS (Equation 4)
within a pooled bandwidth of +/-200 registered voters.
Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-
level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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a 0.15 standard deviation (sd) decrease in the average distance voters had to travel to cast their
votes (p < 0.01). In contrast, a predicted split in 2013 is associated with a weakly positive 0.07
sd increase in the distance to vote (p < 0.1). As indicated by Figure 5, which shows how the
effect of a predicted split varies with the distance of previously unregistered voters, the positive
effect on distance is explained by the previously unregistered voters living far from the new
polling place. When previously unregistered voters were already proximate to the new polling
place, the effects of a predicted split mimic the effects in 2015 with a reduction in distance.
Figure 5: First stage effects by the distance of previously unregistered voters
Distance Registeredvoters














90% and 95% confidence intervals shaded in gray.
Turning to the effects of a predicted split on the number of registered voters, we find sim-
ilar effects across the two rounds of reorganizations. We find that a predicted split in 2013 is
associated with a substantively large 0.46 sd decrease in the number of registered voters at the
corresponding polling station in 2016 (p < 0.01). A predicted split in 2015 generates a com-
parable 0.49 sd decrease in the number of registered voters at the corresponding polling station
in 2016 (p < 0.01).
Overall, we find the partial F-statistics of the instrumental variables for both endogenous
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regressors to be relatively high, with F = 55 for registered voters and F = 10 for distance.15 As
described above, this sufficiently independent variation in the first stages permits identification
of the β1 and β2 parameters.
Instrumental variables
Next, we estimate Equation (5) to examine the independent causal effects of the number of
registered voters per polling station and distance to vote on electoral outcomes. Table 2 presents
the results for the five dependent variables of interest: (1) incumbent turnout; (2) incumbent vote
share; (3) opposition turnout; (4) opposition vote share; and (5) total turnout.
Table 2: Instrumental variables estimates
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.019** -0.007 -0.002 0.010 -0.023***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
D̂istance (β2) 0.033 0.071** -0.039** -0.075** -0.004
(0.024) (0.031) (0.019) (0.032) (0.018)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.04
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Controls include turnout, incumbent turnout, opposi-
tion turnout, and distance, all measured in 2011.
All specifications are estimated using 2SLS (Equation 5) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-200 registered
voters. Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
First, the estimated coefficient for registered voters (β1) in Column 1 implies that a 1 sd
increase in the number of registered voters assigned to a polling station (an addition of 190
voters) generates a 1.9 percentage point (pp), or 5%, decrease in turnout for the incumbent
NRM party (p < 0.05). In contrast, the number of registered voters has no effect on overall
15We compute these partial F-statistics following Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016).
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turnout for the opposition (Column 3). This suggests that the incumbent particularly benefits
from the improved information associated with smaller polling stations. We do not interpret the
effects of registered voters on party vote shares because of Column 5, which shows that a 1 sd
increase in the number of registered voters in a polling station reduces total turnout by 2.3 pp
(p < 0.01). As a result, the estimated effects on party vote shares are likely to be post-treatment
biased.
Second, turning to the effects of distance, we find that a 1 sd increase in distance (an increase
of 2 kilometers) increases the vote share received by the incumbent by 7.1 pp (12%), and reduces
the vote share received by opposition parties by 7.5 pp (19%), both significant at the 5% level.16
Judging from the weak positive effect of distance on incumbent turnout (Column 1), and the
stronger negative effect on opposition turnout (Column 3), the effect of distance on vote shares
is likely caused by opposition voters being effectively disenfranchised by the longer distances.
The estimates in Column 5 relating to total turnout are consistent with this interpretation, with
a 1 sd increase in distance having a relatively precise null effect on turnout.
The overall F-statistic for the IV analysis, which we compute following Kleibergen and Paap
(2006), is around 6. While the conventional heuristic for a strong instrument is that such statistics
should be at least 10, this applies only to the case of a single endogenous regressor (Staiger and
Stock 1997). With multiple endogenous regressors, as we have, we therefore compare the F-
statistic to the critical values provided by Stock and Yogo (2005).17 This exercise indicates that
we can reject levels of bias relative to the bias of OLS estimates of above 15%, which represents
relatively strong identification.18
16Since the number of registered voters affects total turnout, the estimates in Columns 2 and 4 using vote shares
are post-treatment biased and hence difficult to interpret. However, because distance has a null effect on total
turnout (Column 5), we can consider the effects of distance on vote share for the incumbent and opposition.
17The Stock & Yogo critical values rely on the assumption of i.i.d. errors, which is violated in our setting since
we cluster the standard errors. However, since alternative critical values are only computable in the case of one
endogenous regressor, it is common empirical practice to nonetheless compare computed F-statistics to the Stock
& Yogo values (Andrews et al. 2019).
18Two additional pieces of evidence suggest that weak identification is not significantly affecting our estimates.
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The instrumental variables estimates confirm that the incumbent faces a trade-off. Creating
new polling places improves their electoral outcomes through increased monitoring—the in-
cumbent’s turnout is greater at polling stations with fewer registered voters—while simultane-
ously worsening their electoral outcomes by reducing their control over the electorate. Because
the incumbent has a comparative advantage in turnout buying, their electoral support is greater
when voters face longer distances to vote.
Which effect dominates?
Finally, we consider the net effect of polling place creation on electoral outcomes. In Table 3,
we report estimates of reduced form effects by regressing the five outcome variables in Table 2
onto the regressors in Equation (4). The results show that the 2013 reorganization contributed
unequivocally to the incumbent’s electoral outcomes in 2016. This is because the reorganization
decreased the number of voters per polling station, which boosted the incumbent’s turnout, while
the average increase in distance to vote reduced the opposition’s turnout. Overall, as Figure 6
indicates, splits in 2013 contributed to increases in the incumbent’s vote share, especially so in
places where previously unregistered voters were most distant, with effects of up to 3pp, or 5%.
In turn, the 2015 reorganization had an overall null effect on incumbent turnout, a weakly
positive effect on opposition turnout, and a positive effect on total turnout. As a result, this leads
to statistically insignificant drop in incumbent vote share of less than 1pp. This results from a
combination of the reduction in the number of registered voters per polling station not con-
tributing as much to incumbent turnout and, in contrast to the 2013 reorganization, an average
reduction in distance to vote that increased opposition turnout.
First, we perform robustness tests where, at the risk of introducing a violation of the monotonicity assumption,
we exclude the interaction T13 × DPUV13, which strengthens the overall F-statistic and has little effect on the IV
estimates (see Table A8). Second, in Table A10 we estimate the “naive” OLS regression and find these estimates
to be strikingly similar to the IV estimates.
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Table 3: Reduced form estimates
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T13 (α1) 0.012** 0.009 -0.001 -0.011* 0.013***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.002 0.010 -0.008* -0.008 -0.008*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
T15 (α2) 0.003 -0.007 0.006* 0.008 0.009**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Controls include turnout, incumbent turnout,
opposition turnout, and distance, all measured in 2011.
All specifications are estimated using OLS (Equation 4) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-200 reg-
istered voters. Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
























90% and 95% confidence intervals shaded in gray.
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In the Appendix, we demonstrate the robustness of each set of estimates to (1) different
bandwidths (Figures A6, A7, A8), (2) different samples (Tables A5 and A7), and (3) different
specifications (Tables A8 and A9). All results are consistent with our baseline estimates.
The polling places that resulted from the 2013 and 2015 reorganizations thus appear to have
an ambiguous overall effect on the level of electoral support enjoyed by the incumbent. While
the reduction in the number of registered voters per polling station improved incumbent turnout,
the equivalent reductions in distance to vote caused primarily by the 2015 reorganization did
not help incumbent turnout or vote share.
However, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the benefits for the incumbent of
the 2013 and 2015 reorganizations in Uganda outweigh the costs. First, we identify every case
of a polling place split due to the 2013 reorganization (n = 6, 780) or the 2015 reorganization
(n = 2, 222). Second, we apply the relevant estimated local average treatment effects from
Table 3 to each split polling place and multiply by the total number of registered voters to
compute how many additional votes the incumbent received as a result of the splits. Third, we
sum this quantity across all polling stations in 2016. This exercise suggests that around 53,000
votes are attributable to the splitting of polling places, which corresponds to around 0.5% of
the incumbent’s overall vote share. While insufficient to have any decisive effect on aggregate
electoral outcomes, the calculation demonstrates how seemingly impartial administrative rules
can havemeaningful electoral consequences, and thus shape incumbents’ incentives to influence
electoral administration.
8 Discussion
To reiterate, we find strong evidence that the incumbent NRM party in Uganda—which is in
a position to shape the country’s electoral infrastructure—faces a trade-off in its evaluation of
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whether to increase the number of polling places. Doing so reduces the distance voters have to
travel to cast their vote, which levels the playing field between incumbent and challenger parties.
When voters have to travel long distances, the resource-rich incumbent is better able than the
opposition to control the electorate by selectively mobilizing supporters. However, this effect is
dominated by the fact that increasing the number of polling places simultaneously reduces the
number of registered voters per polling place. This favors the incumbent because its improved
information about local levels of support incentivizes both brokers and groups of voters.
Even though these results draw on an empirical context specific to Uganda, the conditions
necessary for incumbents to influence electoral administration in pursuit of electoral benefits
are not unique. To assess how the basic forces we identify travel beyond our context, we col-
lected an original dataset of the average number of registered voters per polling station in use
for presidential elections in sub-Saharan African countries since 1990.19 Importantly, there is
significant variation across countries in the average number of registered voters assigned to a
polling station. The data sources and collection is described in Appendix A.3.
We then consider how this relates to incumbent influence. First, we consider how properties
of each country’s regime type affect the degree of independence of its electoral authorities. In
the top row of Figure 7 we categorize countries as a democracy or autocracy (top-left panel) and
as having strong or weak presidentialism (top-right panel). We find that autocratic countries,
and countries with strong presidentialism, have notably less independent electoral authorities.
This is the case across three different measures of EC independence, with the most conservative
estimate suggesting a 10pp difference. While many incumbents are likely to face incentives
to control the expansion of polling places, then, we should expect such incentives to be acted
upon in countries with less independent electoral authorities—that is, in autocracies and strong
19This comprises 45 unique countries, and 283 country-election observations. The dataset contains 74% of all































































Figure 7: Cross-national comparisons
Next, we consider how the average number of registered voters per polling place varies
by regime type depicted in the bottom row of Figure 7. The figures illustrate how countries
where the incumbent has considerable influence over electoral authorities have fewer registered
voters per polling place than countries where the incumbent has less control over the electoral
authorities. In both cases, the difference in size carries practical importance, as countries where
incumbents have less control over election authorities have about 100 more registered voters
per polling place, or 15% of the total polling place size, than countries where incumbents have
more control.
If the expansion of polling places were driven only by sincere democratic motives, then the
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fact that polling places are smaller in autocratic regimes is counterintuitive. These cross-national
comparisons therefore suggest that the strategic design of polling places is not exclusively a
concern in Uganda. Instead, it is a risk in all countries where the incumbent exercises substantial
control over the electoral administration. As more than 50% of sub-Saharan Africa countries
are characterized by authoritarianism or an otherwise powerful executive, either subtle or overt
interventions into the design of voting infrastructure appears to be a regional concern.
9 Conclusion
Relatively little attention has been paid to how incumbents manipulate voting infrastructure
in order to maximize their support in contexts where electoral authorities lack autonomy. To
address this gap, we empirically investigate the incentives faced by incumbents to manipulate
a fundamental part of the election voting infrastructure: the number and location of polling
places.
We argue that, confronted with the decision of whether to expand the number of polling
places prior to an election, the incumbent faces a trade-off. On the one hand, expanding the
number of polling places reduces the number of registered voters at each polling station. This
provides the incumbent party’s political machine with a higher quality signal about broker per-
formance and collective voting behavior, which has been proven to increase the electoral support
for the incumbent because the incumbent can use this information to reward individual brokers
and groups of voters who support the party. On the other hand, increasing the number of polling
places simultaneously reduces the distance traveled by voters to cast ballots. This undercuts the
incumbent’s control over the electorate, an advantage it holds over opposition parties due to the
resources it can leverage to buy turnout, and thus reduces electoral support for the incumbent.
Incumbent incentives to introduce new polling places therefore come down to which mechanism
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has the strongest effect.
We empirically study this trade-off in the context of the 2016 Ugandan presidential elec-
tions. Uganda is a typical electoral autocracy, with an electoral playing field heavily skewed to-
wards the incumbent party. Studying the trade off quantitatively is challenging because both the
number of registered voters and the distance traveled by voters to the polling place are endoge-
nous. Consequently, to empirically identify the effects using an instrumental variable design,
we need at least two sufficiently independent instruments. To surmount this challenge, we use a
regression discontinuity design that exploits the repeated application of an administrative rule,
implemented in 2013 and 2015, in which polling places exceeding 900 registered voters were
split into multiple geographically dispersed polling places. We find that incumbent parties do
indeed face a trade-off. Specifically, we find that splitting polling places has a positive effect
on incumbent electoral outcomes by reducing the number of registered voters per polling place
but a negative effect by reducing the distance voters have to travel to vote. On balance, we find
that the reorganizations led to positive effects on incumbent electoral outcomes, suggesting the
gains from better information outweigh the costs of reduced control over the electorate.
The insights provided have important implications for democratic consolidation in sub-
Saharan Africa and beyond. Encouraged by the recommendations from international organi-
zations, African governments have reorganized their voting infrastructure with the stated aim
of heightening political participation. These initiatives are driven by stated expectation that
such reorganization empowers citizens by removing barriers to vote, specifically by reducing
distances voters have to travel to cast their votes. Consequently, such initiatives are believed to
have positive effects on the quality of democracy. Our results imply that such positive effects
are limited by a negative effect: an increase in polling places improves the efficiency of political
machines. This, in turn, improves the electoral fortunes of incumbent candidates who enjoy a
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comparative advantage in turnout buying. Building on these insights, the natural next step would
thus be to rethink ways in which to enhance democratic participation without simultaneously
facilitating incumbents’ use of clientelist voter mobilization strategies.
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The following section describes our approach to matching polling places across datasets (A.1)
as well as how we geocode polling places and calculate average weighted distances (A.2). The
final section describes the data processing behind the cross-national data used in the paper (A.3).
A.1 Matching polling places across elections
Sources. For matching polling places over time we rely on five administrative datasets. The
two central datasets are made up of lists of the official polling stations in use for the 2011 (n =
23,968) and 2016 elections (n = 28,010). In addition, we make use of the full voter registers
for 2011 (n = 13.7 million voters) and 2016 (n = 15.3 million voters) elections. For the 2015
reorganization, we use the number of registered voters for villages in each polling station after
the first reorganization but before the second reorganization (N = 193,000 polling station-village
observations).
Aggregate polling station to polling place level. In the first step we aggregate polling stations
to polling places. This was done by removing any extension after the polling place name (often
the venue, e.g. “primary school x", “x trade center") indicating the specific station, including
“[A-D]"; “[E-Z]", "A";“B", “I";“II", “1";“2". Doing this we find 21,593 unique polling places
in 2011, 23,730 unique polling places in 2015, and 24,367 unique polling places in 2016.
Harmonize administrative unit names across years. When matching polling places over time,
we initially match a string containing the district name, county name, subcounty name, parish
name and polling place name. Prior to matching polling places, the second step therefore entails
harmonizing administrative unit names across elections. In order to identify the same admin-
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istrative unit over time, we rely on a similar approach to the one sketched in Figure A1, and
elaborated in the next section. However, instead of using voters and villages, we rely on lower-
level administrative units, including subcounties, parishes, and villages. In addition, a research
assistant provided invaluable assistance with manual coding.
Match polling places across datasets. A universal polling place numerical identification code
exists for polling places inUganda, but this code proved unreliable whenmatching polling places
across elections. When matching polling places across datasets, we therefore rely on a combina-
tion of stringmatching, as well as matching lower-level units across time. We exerted substantial
effort in matching very high percentages across elections, as the polling places hardest to iden-
tify were likely our study’s central observations: polling places split between elections. Of the
polling places within our discontinuity sample, we are able to match 4,937 polling places in
2013 to polling stations in 2016 (failing to match 241) and match 4,009 polling places in 2015
to polling stations in 2016 (failing to match 89).
a) String matching entails matching polling places across datasets when names are not identi-
cal, but nonetheless describe the same polling station. This can either be due to typos, or minor
variations in name. The string matching procedure includes twenty different regular expres-
sions, including removing all whitespace, removing all punctuation, deleting venue identifica-
tion (e.g. “primary school"), and splitting up long names. The final match is identified as the
polling place in the matching dataset that matches the most times across the different regular
expressions. This is implemented either for the full identification string or by leaving out one ad-
ministrative unit at a time, starting from parish and moving towards district. In instances where
this does not lead to a match, two administrative unit names are excluded from the identification
string.
The string matching proved particularly useful, as it was used not only to match the 2016
A2
polling places to the pre-2013 polling places (95.9% match) and 2015 polling places (97.8%
match), but also the 2016 polling station results (99.9% match), and the geocoded polling sta-
tions (90.0%match). Finally, the procedure was used to match pre-2013 polling stations to 2011
electoral results (99.3% match).











b) Matching using lower-level units was needed in cases where polling places split between
elections. The naming convention deems that such new polling places take the name of their new
location, and for this reason string matching will not identify matches. When matching polling
places, we specifically rely on the corresponding villages and voters. We are able tomatch voters
across the 2011 and 2016 voter registers, and subsequently extract the 2011 polling place name.
A match is defined as the polling place in 2011 with the largest share of voters from the 2016
polling place, one requirement being that at least 10% percent of the 2016 voters are identified
at the 2011 polling place. We apply the same approach for corresponding villages, which are
also available in the voter registers and in 2015. The matching procedure was also applied to
match administrative units over time. An example is to match subcounties over time by looking
at the share of parishes, polling places or villages matching across datasets.
A.2 Calculating distances to vote
The following section describes how we 1) geocode polling places and 2) calculate distances to
the respective villages.
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Sources. A central source of data for this exercise is a data set of polling station coordinatesmade
available to us by the Ugandan Electoral Commission. Specifically, we received two datasets,
one containing the locations of 25,541 polling stations, while the other contained 12,101 polling
station locations. Importantly, the datasets 1) have a number of overlaps (a rough estimate sug-
gests 5,000+ overlaps) 2) are not exhaustive. For the latter reason, we additionally geocode
polling stations ourselves. To geocode the 2016 polling places we rely on the 2016 parish demar-
cations (N = 7,435), administrative data on common polling place locations, including schools,
trade centers, health centers, religious institutions, and local administrative headquarters (N =
85,334), containing information on different names of just short of 81,000 administrative units.
In order to match administrative unit names in the polling station data to these shapefiles, we
rely on the National Geography File (N = 80,866). The file contains the identification codes for
the shapefiles containing parishes, subcounties, counties and districts acting as search areas (see
below). Finally, we use the 2014 village census (N = 74,277). The latter comes in a polygon
format which we turn into coordinates by calculating the centroid.
Geocoding polling stations. First, we match the polling station data to the National Geography
File (version 8.0, Oct 28 2016). The National Geography File acts as a “dictionary" file, translat-
ing just short of 81,000 administrative unit names and codes between different official datasets.
We match the 2016 polling station data to the National Geography File using the share of lower
level units, as sketched in Figure A1, with the requirement that the match has to contain at least
a third of the lower-level units.
In order to geolocate the polling places, we limit the pool of locations to venues within the
given polling station’s respective search area by excluding all locations outside the search area
usingmap overlaying. If nomatch is foundwithin the parish, the search area is expanded to, first,
subcounty, then county and, finally, district. Within the search area, we use the string matching
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function explained above to identify the polling station in the geocoded data. 23,560 of polling
stations are geocoded to locations within their respective parish, 1,782 within the subcounty,
602 within the county and 221 within the district.
Calculating average distance from villages to polling stations. Having successfully geocoded
the polling station within the search area, we next identify the villages registered to the polling
station in question. Again, we exclude all villages outside the search area using map overlaying.
By excluding all villages not located in immediate vicinity to the polling station, we can loosen
the string matching requirements substantially. In addition to the search area, we include vil-
lages within a buffer of 10 kilometers around the polling station location, in order to not exclude
relevant villages which, for one reason or another, are located on the “wrong" side of, say, the
parish border, but otherwise in close vicinity to the polling station. It still applies that if a village
with a sufficiently similar name is located closer to the polling station, this village is selected.
When we have located the relevant villages, we calculate distances from the villages to the
identified polling station. In cases where several polling stations were identified as possible
matches, we select the polling station with the shortest average distance to the villages. Polling
station-village combinations farther than 20 kilometers are not considered. Doing this, we create
a data frame at the village-polling station level, which we aggregate to the polling station unit
by averaging all village distances for each polling station, weighted by the number of registered
voters at the specific village.20
Overall, we identify 84% of the 145,000 village-polling station observations and we match
80% of the villages. For 93.6% of the 2016 polling stations do we identify at least one village.
In cases where we identify at least one village, we identify 91 percent of villages on average
across polling stations, while we for 3% of polling stations identify less than 50% of villages.
20For example, if a polling place contains 9 registered voters from village A, which is 0.5 km away, and 3 voters
from village B, which is 1 km away, the distance measure is ( 912 · 0.5) + (
3
12 · 1) = 0.625 km.
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Villages vary in importance, conditioned on how many of its residents vote at the given polling
station. Overall, we identify 83.8% of all 2016 registered voters across the 28,010 polling sta-
tions. Excluding polling stations for which we do not locate any villages, we identify 87.7%
of all voters on average. We identify less than 50% of voters in 12.3% of polling stations. For
7.4% of 2016 polling stations distance is missing. Table A1 shows a comparison of the match
between the 2011 and 2015 polling stations with the 2016 polling stations.
Table A1: Matching polling stations and villages
Matches Quality of matches
Overall Villages Villages matched Voters matched Less than 50% of villages
non-missing matched per PS* (mean) per PS* (mean) matched per PS*
2016 92.6% 84.0% 91.2% 83.8% 3%
2015 87.3% 85.7% 87.1% 71.8% 4%
2011 83.4% 74.1% 82.0% 44.7% 6%
*Polling stations for which at least one village is matched.
A.3 Cross-national data
Sources. For the cross-national data we also rely on a range of sources. For data on elec-
tions held in Sub-Saharan Africa, including information on the numbrer of registered voters,
we rely on International Idea’s database available at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/
continent-view/Africa/40. We also make use of Idea’s categorization of models of elec-
toral management available at the same webpage. Information on regime type and the type of
presidentialism (weak or strong, respectively) is found in the Varieties of Democracy dataset v9
(Coppedge 2019). Specifically, we make use of the regimes of the world variable “v2x_regime"
and the presidentialism index “v2xnp_pres". We furthermoremake use of the variable “v2elembaut_ord"
asking if the election management body has autonomy from government to apply election laws
and administrative rules impartially in national elections. To measure the impartiality of the
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electoral commission we also rely on the UNDP’s report on Principles for Independent and Sus-
tainable Electoral Management (see https://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/).
Information on the number of polling places was collected by the authors, relying on sources in-
cluding reports published by e.g. the Carter Center, the European Union’s Election Observation
Missions, as well as international and local media.
Data processing. Two of the central variables, regime and presidentialism, were recoded to bi-
nary variables. v2x_regime includes four categories: “closed autocracy", “electoral autocracy",
“electoral democracy", and “liberal democracy", which we recoded to “autocracy" or “democ-
racy". v2xnp_pres is an index of the strength of presidentialism, which we recoded to a binary
variable depending on whether the observation was above (“strong") or below (“weak") the me-
dian. Polling place size was created by dividing the number of registered voters with the number
of polling places in use for the election. We study observations from 1995 onwards. The inde-
pendence of electoral commissions was coded as a binary variable scoring “1" if the electoral
commission is independent from the government and membership is expert based, and “0" if
the electoral commission is run by the government and membership is partisan. In creating the
outcome of interest (either the mean polling place size or mean independence of electoral com-
mission) across regime type and presidentialism, we averaged the outcome of interest within
each category. Specifically, every observation was weighted by one over the number of obser-
vations which the country in question contributed with. This way, no country affects the overall
mean and standard deviation more than others, irrespective of the number of elections included
for any particular country.
A7
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Figure A2: Overlap between discontinuity samples














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A3: Polling stations included in discontinuity sample
Note Polling stations that appear in our discontinuity sample are shaded in gray. The black dot represents Kampala.
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Registered Voters at Polling Place (2016)
















Figure A4: Distributions of polling place sizes over time
Figure illustrates the distribution of registered voters at polling places for the whole sample. From panel (a) and
panel (b) it can be observed that a substantial number of observations exist on either side of the 900-voter threshold
in both the 2013 and 2015 subsamples, which are used to construct the discontinuity samples. The discontinuous
drop observed in 2016 is a direct implication of the administrative rules we leverage in the research design.
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Figure A5: Density of Polling Stations Around Cutoff
Figure indicates that the density of polling places on either side of the threshold in 2013 and 2015 is comparable.
By showing that no discontinuity in density exists around the threshold, Figure A5 supports the assumption of no
sorting. Balance tests in Table A3 further indicates that no sorting of types seems to take place.






























































































95% confidence intervals plotted. Estimated using Equation (5) with varying pooled bandwidths.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables
Incumbent turnout 0.43 0.16 0.00 1.00
Incumbent vote share 0.60 0.18 0.00 1.00
Opposition turnout 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.73
Opposition vote share 0.35 0.18 0.00 1.00
Turnout 0.71 0.09 0.15 1.00
Independent variables
Registered voters 539.66 185.01 27.00 1126.00
Distance 1283.82 1584.51 0.00 39177.60
Pre-2016 variables
Registered voters in PP (2011) 713.17 551.34 17.00 7434.00
Registered voters in PP (2015) 708.35 548.64 4.00 7718.00
Distance (2013) 1456.84 1523.89 0.00 14980.14
Distance (2015) 1327.70 1233.84 0.00 9938.00
Other variables
PP split (2013) 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
PP split (2015) 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Share of voters geolocated 89.75 22.17 0.11 100.00
Descriptive statistics computed at the polling station level in 2016.
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T13 (α1) -0.03 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.04 (0.06)
T15 (α2) -0.05 (0.05)
Incumbent vote share (2011)
T13 (α1) 0.00 (0.02)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.01 (0.02)
T15 (α2) 0.02 (0.01)
Opposition turnout (2011)
T13 (α1) -0.03 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.10 (0.07)
T15 (α2) 0.12** (0.06)
Opposition vote share (2011)
T13 (α1) 0.00 (0.02)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.01 (0.02)
T15 (α2) 0.02 (0.01)
Turnout (2011)
T13 (α1) -0.06 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.04 (0.06)
T15 (α2) 0.03 (0.06)
Pre-treatment distance
T13 (α1) 0.04 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.04 (0.06)
T15 (α2) 0.16***(0.06)
Invalid votes (2011)
T13 (α1) -0.01 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.03 (0.06)
T15 (α2) -0.02 (0.05)
Longitude
T13 (α1) -0.00 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.04 (0.06)
T15 (α2) 0.04 (0.05)
Latitude
T13 (α1) 0.13** (0.07)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.07 (0.07)
T15 (α2) 0.01 (0.05)
Estimates from regressing pre-treatment covariates de-
fined pre-2013 reorganization onto the right hand side of
Equation 4.
All specifications are estimated using OLS (Equation 4)
within a pooled bandwidth of +/-200 registered voters.
Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-
level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A14




T13 (α1) 0.05 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.09 (0.07)
T15 (α2) 0.08 (0.06)
Distance to village
T13 (α1) -0.08 (0.07)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.06 (0.06)
T15 (α2) -0.10 (0.07)
School
T13 (α1) -0.06 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.01 (0.06)
T15 (α2) 0.08 (0.05)
Health facility
T13 (α1) -0.00 (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.01 (0.07)
T15 (α2) -0.04 (0.06)
Religious building
T13 (α1) -0.01 (0.05)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.02 (0.06)
T15 (α2) 0.07 (0.05)
Market
T13 (α1) -0.10* (0.06)
T13 (α1) × DPUV -0.05 (0.06)
T15 (α2) -0.00 (0.06)
Admin building
T13 (α1) -0.05 (0.07)
T13 (α1) × DPUV 0.03 (0.07)
T15 (α2) 0.03 (0.06)
Estimates from regressing covariates defined in
2016 onto the right hand side of Equation 4.
All specifications are estimated using OLS
(Equation 4) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-
200 registered voters. Standard errors clus-
tered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Reduced Form (Robustness)
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I. Weighted
T13 (α1) 0.011** 0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.015***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.003 0.011* -0.007* -0.008 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
T15 (α2) 0.006 -0.004 0.005 0.004 0.011***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
II. Excluding Kampala
T13 (α1) 0.010** 0.007 -0.001 -0.009 0.011***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.004 0.013* -0.009** -0.011* -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
T15 (α2) 0.006 -0.004 0.006 0.004 0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.41 0.59 0.25 0.36 0.69
Observations 12354 12354 12354 12354 12354
III. Excluding parishes with 10,000+ voters
T13 (α1) 0.009* 0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.011***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.003 0.012* -0.009** -0.010 -0.008*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
T15 (α2) 0.003 -0.007 0.007* 0.008 0.010***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.41 0.59 0.25 0.36 0.69
Observations 12252 12252 12252 12252 12252
IV. Excluding PS 2 sd or more from a road
T13 (α1) 0.012** 0.009 -0.001 -0.012* 0.014***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T13 ×DPUV13 (α2) 0.003 0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
T15 (α2) 0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.007 0.010**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.38 0.69
Observations 11583 11583 11583 11583 11583
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Panel I weights observations by the num-
ber of polling stations in the same polling place in 2013/2015. Panel II excludes Kampala.
Panel III excludes polling stations in parishes with more than 10,000 total registered vot-
ers. Panel IV excludes polling stations more than 2 standard deviations from a road.
All specifications are estimated using OLS (Equation 4) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-
200 registered voters. Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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T13 (α1) -0.489*** 0.070*
(0.043) (0.039)
T15 (α2) -0.478*** -0.147***
(0.043) (0.050)
Partial F-statistic 111.59 17.72
Observations 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016.
Outcome variables: Column (1): Standardized
number of registered voters in polling station;
(2): Standardized distance of voters to polling
station. Controls include turnout, incumbent
turnout, opposition turnout, and distance, all
measured using data from 2011 election. Partial
F-statistic computed following Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016).
All specifications are estimated using OLS
(Equation 4) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-
200 registered voters but exclude the DPUV
interaction. Standard errors clustered at the
2013/2015 polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A7: Instrumental Variables (Robustness)
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I. Weighted
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.017** -0.007 -0.002 0.008 -0.021***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
D̂istance (β2) 0.022 0.056* -0.032 -0.054 -0.011
(0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.033) (0.021)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
II. Excluding Kampala
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.019** -0.009 -0.000 0.012 -0.023***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
D̂istance (β2) 0.025 0.059** -0.038** -0.062** -0.012
(0.023) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 6.73 6.73 6.73 6.73 6.73
Control Mean 0.41 0.59 0.25 0.36 0.69
Observations 12354 12354 12354 12354 12354
III. Excluding parishes with 10,000+ voters
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.016* -0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.019***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
D̂istance (β2) 0.023 0.058** -0.038** -0.062** -0.015
(0.022) (0.027) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 7.34 7.34 7.34 7.34 7.34
Control Mean 0.41 0.59 0.25 0.36 0.69
Observations 12252 12252 12252 12252 12252
IV. Excluding PS 2 sd or more from a road
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.021** -0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.026***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
D̂istance (β2) 0.031 0.063** -0.032* -0.069** 0.002
(0.024) (0.030) (0.019) (0.031) (0.018)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.49
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.38 0.69
Observations 11583 11583 11583 11583 11583
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Panel I weights observations by the num-
ber of polling stations in the same polling place in 2013/2015. Panel II excludes Kampala.
Panel III excludes polling stations in parishes with more than 10,000 total registered vot-
ers. Panel IV excludes polling stations more than 2 standard deviations from a road.
All specifications are estimated using 2SLS (Equation 5) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-
200 registered voters. Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Weprovide a full set of specificationswherewe do not include the interaction T13×DPUV13,
and so just use the indicators T13 and T15 as instruments. In Tables A6, A8, and A9 we accord-
ingly estimate the first stage, instrumental variables, and reduced form specifications. We find
that all the coefficients remain similarly estimated when using this alternative set of specifica-
tions. Last, to consider the external validity of the results, we show in Table A10 that OLS
estimates of the effects of our two endogenous variables on electoral outcomes are strikingly
similar to the IV estimates.
Table A8: Instrumental variables without DPUV interaction
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
̂Registered voters (β1) -0.018** -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.025***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
D̂istance (β2) 0.040 0.066** -0.030 -0.081** 0.021
(0.029) (0.034) (0.021) (0.036) (0.022)
Weak Instrument F-statistic 7.98 7.98 7.98 7.98 7.98
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Outcome variables: Column (1): turnout for
incumbent; (2) vote share for incumbent; (3) turnout for opposition parties; (4) vote share for
opposition parties; (5) overall turnout. Controls include turnout, incumbent turnout, opposition
turnout, and distance, all measured in 2011.
All specifications are estimated using 2SLS (Equation 5) within a pooled bandwidth of +/-200
registered voters but excluding the DPUV interaction. Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015
polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A9: Reduced form without DPUV interaction
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T13 (α1) 0.012** 0.007 -0.000 -0.010* 0.014***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
T15 (α2) 0.003 -0.007 0.006* 0.008 0.009**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.69
Observations 12895 12895 12895 12895 12895
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Outcome variables: Column
(1): turnout for incumbent; (2) vote share for incumbent; (3) turnout for opposi-
tion parties; (4) vote share for opposition parties; (5) overall turnout. Controls in-
clude turnout, incumbent turnout, opposition turnout, and distance, all measured
in 2011.
All specifications are estimated using OLS (Equation 4) within a pooled bandwidth
of +/-200 registered voters but exclude the DPUV interaction. Standard errors
clustered at the 2013/2015 polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A10: OLS estimates
Incumbent Opposition
Turnout Vote share Turnout Vote share Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I. Full sample
Registered voters -0.019*** -0.007*** -0.002*** 0.010*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.009*** -0.018*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Control Mean 0.43 0.60 0.24 0.36 0.71
Observations 22094 22094 22094 22094 22094
II. Discontinuity sample
Registered voters -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 0.008*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.016*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Control Mean 0.40 0.58 0.25 0.37 0.68
Observations 9947 9947 9947 9947 9947
Unit of observation is the polling station in 2016. Outcome variables: Column (1): turnout for
incumbent; (2) vote share for incumbent; (3) turnout for opposition parties; (4) vote share for
opposition parties; (5) overall turnout. Controls include turnout, incumbent turnout, opposi-
tion turnout, and distance, all measured in 2011.
All specifications are estimated using OLS using either the full sample of polling stations (Panel
I) or the pooled discontinuity sample (Panel II). Standard errors clustered at the 2013/2015
polling place-level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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